The Model
• Agents work for T = 53 years (13-65) and live for a maximum of T = 78 years (13-90) years. That is, agents with age t ∈ {1, ..., T } are active, and agents with age t ∈ © T + 1, ..., T ª are retirees.
• Conditional on their wealth A t , their location, and their employment status agents decide how much to consume C t , save/borrow at rate of return r, and on employment transitions. They are not allow to borrow, that is, there the lower bound for assets is zero.
• Their utility U (·) depends only on their consumption; the subjective discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1) and their location: if they reside in their home country they enjoy extra utility ψ.
• Retirees just live off their savings.
• Location is denoted by k t (= 0, 1), where 0 stands for their home country and 1 for the destination country.
• If the agent decides to switch location, s/he has to pay a monetary cost c k and enters the new market as unemployed.
• Active agents can be unemployed or employed.
• When unemployed, conditional on their location, they receive a wage offer with probability λ k t , drawn from a wage offer distribution F k (·), (x ∈ (w, w), 0 < w < w < ∞).
• When employed, they get laid off with probability θ k t and with probability π k t they receive a wage offer drawn from the same distribution.F k (·). • Arrival and layoff rates and mean log-wages evolve over time.
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The present discounted utility of a retired agent V R t is
where, in the absence of bequest motives, A T +1 = 0.
. The present discounted utility of an unemployed agent V u t is
.
The present discounted utility of an employed agent V e t is
Solution: Policy rules
Since there are no close form solution, we need to assume specific functional forms:
• CRRA utility function
• F k (x) : base wage offer distribution,:
ln ω ∼ N(μ k , σ 2 k |w, w); 0 < w < w < ∞, k = 0, 1.
• Wage growth function
• Age-dependent arrival and layoff rates given by the logistic function
and q 0 are the initial arrival and layoff rates. This expression comes from
and letting α q 0 = ln
• The initial asset distribution at age 13 is a displaced lognormal:.
• We reparameterize:
Then we use the model to simulate 50,000 individual trajectories and compute some selected moments. 
Mexican Urban Employment Survey
• 1999 survey.
• rotating panel on employment status, employment transitions and wages of individuals
• Wages in Mexico are measured as annual wage income.
• representative of urban Mexico
US. CPS
• 1999 January to December waves.
• rotating panel on employment status, employment transitions and wages of individuals.
• Wages in the US are also measured as annual wage income.
• representative data set of the US population.
Mexican Census
• 10% sample of the Mexican Census.
• Sample of 15 to 45 years old males, excluding disabled individuals.
US. Census
• 5% sample of the US Census
. 2. Unemployment and job loss rates are initially higher, but end up being lower in Mexico than in the US.
3. Exit from unemployment in Mexico is initially lower but grows faster and ends up overtaking the US. one.
4. Job-to-job transitions are substantially larger in the US than in Mexico at all ages.
Estimation Simulated Method of Moments (SMM).
This procedure relates a parameter set to a weighed measure of distance between sample and simulated moments:
where ∆m = (m a − m p ) is the distance between each sample and predicted moment and W is a weighing matrix and Θ = © Thus, there are 510 moments to estimate 16 parameters. .
Results

Regime Changes
How do the predicted trajectories change with alternative scenarios:
1. Improvement of labor market conditions in Mexico:
• Displacing the wage offer distribution.
• Having the same arrival rate while employed of the US. at any age, i.e., both base value and growth.
Migration costs variations:
• Doubling costs of migration from Mexico to the US.
• Subsidizing return migration from the US to Mexico.
. 
Improvement of Labor Markets in Mexico
Regime changes
• Improvements in the wage offer distribution in Mexico reduces migration rates, increases migration flows of older cohorts and return migration. It also increases the number of individuals who were at least one time in the US, while it decreases their average duration in the US.
• A more dynamic labor market in Mexico, i.e. one with faster job-to-job transitions, reduces substantially migration rates to the US.
• Increasing migration costs from Mexico to the US decreases migration rates, migration and return migration flows.
• Subsidizing return migration increases migration rates at young ages, but decreases it for older cohorts; it increases both migration and return migration flowsdoes not affect migration, but reduces return migration substantially.
